Eastern Airlines' bankruptcy illustrates the devastating effect on firm value of court-sponsored asset stripping, i.e., the use of creditors' collateral to invest in high-variance negative net present value projects. During its bankruptcy, Eastern's value dropped over 50%. A substantial portion of this value decline occurred because an overprotective court insulated Eastern from market forces and allowed valuedestroying operations to continue long after it was clear that Eastern should have been shut down. The failure of Eastern's Chapter 11 demonstrates the importance of having a bankruptcy process that protects a distressed firm's assets, not simply from a run by creditors, but also from overly optimistic managers and misguided judges.
3 they reorganize. Ideally, Chapter 11 would allow viable firms to continue operations while undergoing value-increasing asset and financial restructurings. Nonviable firms and parts of firms would be shut down. In other words, Chapter 11 would protect distressed firms but at the same time serve the disciplinary role of the market for corporate control by forcing firms to re-evaluate their operations, restructure, change ownership, or shut down.
In reality, information and agency problems inherent to Chapter 11 often inhibit efficient outcomes (Wruck, 1990) . Even if all parties' interests are aligned, a distressed firm can be difficult to value. Put simply, claimholders must obtain enough reliable information to determine whether the firm's decline in cash flow (and value) is temporary or permanent. This determination is critical because the valuemaximizing way to resolve distress depends on it. A firm in temporary decline can meet its obligations by restructuring its financial claims. A firm in permanent decline typically requires both a reduction in fixed claims and a major restructuring of operations, which can include the shutdown or liquidation of all or part of the firm.
The fact that Chapter 11 requires firms to report detailed information to the court on a frequent basis and allows creditors access to documents through the legal disclosure process does not resolve the information problems referred to above. This is because an increase in the volume and frequency of disclosure does not necessarily imply an increase in the availability of economically useful information.
Indeed, it is managers, whose interests often conflict with those of other claimants, who produce and interpret the disclosed data for the court. In addition, firms in Chapter 11 cease to provide investors with audited financial statements, a source of information bonded by an auditing firm whose reputation depends on the quality of its work.
In many distressed situations, matters are further complicated by severe agency problems. Agency problems arise because each plan of reorganization has implications not only for firm value but for the distribution of value across claimholders. Claimants will support a value-destroying reorganization so long as the value of their "piece of the pie" is greater than that expected from a value-maximizing alternative.
Conflicts generated by the tension between value and distributive concerns result in a situation in which no 4 participant has both the relevant information about firm value and the incentive to reveal that information to others (Wruck, 1990 ).
In pursuing their own interests, claimants are motivated to present biased and inaccurate data and analysis as though it were unbiased and accurate. For example, shareholders have an incentive to claim that the firm is only temporarily in trouble in order to increase the likelihood that they will retain their equity stake. Creditors have an incentive to claim that the firm is permanently damaged to increase the likelihood that they can cut shareholders out of the reorganization. Managers have an incentive to side with the party less likely to fire them. In the resulting confusion, value-reducing reorganization policies can be chosen because they further the interests of persuasive and powerful claimants.
At least two features of Chapter 11 exacerbate agency problems. First, Chapter 11 allows management the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization for at least 120 days (followed by 60 additional days to obtain approval for the plan). In major cases, this period is often extended several times.
Management's right to set the agenda during this time provides them with an opportunity to extract value.
For example, they can threaten (implicitly or explicitly) to manage the firm in a way that makes them better off but destroys value for some or all claimholders. Second, Chapter 11 does not specify how to treat certain claims by nonfinancial stakeholders, including employees and the public (e.g., employees' medical claims and environmental claims). As a result, such constituencies can extract value both directly, by filing claims and lawsuits, and indirectly, by influencing court and public opinion.
The courts' emphasis on preventing premature liquidation makes information problems and conflicts of interest particularly acute when a firm is not economically viable. For example, White (1989) argues that the U.S. bankruptcy process tends to protect nonviable firms and thus prevents resources from flowing to higher-valued uses. In such situations, a judge's assessment of a distressed firm's prospects becomes crucial. The judge can exclude equityholders or other claimants from the process if he concludes they have no claim. He can also include or exclude nontraditional claimants such as employees or the general public. The court also has the discretion to fund a firm's operating deficits using the proceeds of asset sales or debtor-in-possession financing, if it can be obtained. For nonviable operations, this amounts to court-endorsed asset stripping. Asset stripping can persist, in part, because it is difficult to determine whether the court is facilitating value destruction or investing in operations that currently have a negative cash flow but are positive net present value investments.
The above analysis implies that a bankruptcy judge must either be an expert in business strategy and valuation, which is unlikely to be the case, or be able to make skilled use of both outside experts and the market for corporate control. Outside experts can furnish an independent assessment of the firm's prospects, but players in the market for corporate control provide a more credible valuation because they are willing to "put their money where their mouth is." A judge's biases, errors, or misperceptions about the use of experts, the market for corporate control, and the distressed firm's prospects can be extremely
costly. Below we demonstrate how this was the case in Eastern Airlines' bankruptcy.
Eastern Airlines' Chapter 11
Data for our analysis of Eastern Airlines' and its bankruptcy were gathered from financial statements, the financial press, bankruptcy court documents, and interviews with creditors, lawyers, competitors, and other individuals involved in the process. Security prices were obtained from the Wall Street Journal, Merrill Lynch High Yield Research, Salomon Brothers High Yield Trading Group, and the Center for Research in Security Prices. Data on the market price of aircraft were obtained from Pulvino (1995) .
We sometimes use individuals' words to communicate how and why events in Eastern's bankruptcy unfolded as they did. These statements provide verifiable data on views of how information problems and conflicts of interest affected Eastern's value. To ensure integrity of the data collection process, interviewed parties reviewed their quotes to correct inaccuracies, but agreed not to dictate the substance of our analysis or conclusions. It was also agreed that parties could choose to be anonymous to avoid potential damage to their firms or to their clients' position.
A brief history of Eastern Airlines
Founded in 1938, Eastern Airlines was an independent company until 1986, when it was acquired by Texas Air for $640 million. Eastern's routes were concentrated in the highly competitive East Coast corridor. In addition, Eastern offered service to South America and the Caribbean. Frank Lorenzo bought 6 Texas Air in 1972 and used it as a base to build a large airline holding company, acquiring Continental, Eastern, People's Express, and Frontier Airlines. He developed a reputation as an effective union buster after Continental made a controversial "strategic" bankruptcy filing on August 24, 1983. Continental operated in Chapter 11 for two years, throughout which time management pressured striking workers to take pay cuts as large as 50%. Ultimately, Continental emerged from bankruptcy with a more competitive cost structure. Labor costs fell from 36% to 22% of operating costs (Notable Corporate Chronologies, Gale Research, Inc.) AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland dubbed Lorenzo "the Typhoid Mary of organized labor" (The Economist, March 11, 1989, American Survey, p. 26) .
In 1985, one year prior to its acquisition, Eastern was a large airline with lackluster performance.
With $3.9 billion in assets and $4.8 billion in revenues, Eastern ranked third among U.S. airlines, behind United and American. Between 1985 and 1986, Eastern's performance declined, as did the performance of other U.S. airlines. Table 1 presents financial performance data on Eastern and the industry. From 1985 to 1986, Eastern's operating profit before depreciation fell 25%, from $527 million to $395 million. Net income dropped from $6.3 million to negative $131 million. This decline in performance was not due to downsizing since total assets increased 18% from $3.9 billion to $4.6 billion. During the same period, Eastern's operating profit before depreciation as a percentage of total assets fell from 13.6% to 8.6%. The same measure for the industry fell from 13.2% to 6.0% on average, and 12.5% to 9.5% at the median. In 1986, Eastern's performance was around the middle of the pack; of its 13 Compustat-listed competitors, five performed more poorly than Eastern.
After becoming part of Texas Air, Eastern's performance relative to the industry deteriorated. By 1988, only Braniff underperformed Eastern. Operating income declined to $112 million, and the company incurred a net loss of $335 million. Eastern's operating profit before depreciation as a percent of total assets was 3%, while the average and median for the industry were 10.5% and 12.4%, respectively.
Eastern's history of high wages and poor labor relations contributed to its poor performance.
Shortly before the merger, Eastern's management had threatened to file for bankruptcy protection if employees refused to take a wage cut. After the merger, Lorenzo's history of union busting increased the existing animosity between labor and management, which culminated in a strike by Eastern's machinists on 7 March 4, 1989. The pilots and flight attendants, who were also unionized, refused to cross the picket line, crippling the firm's ability to operate. Five days later, on March 9, 1989, Eastern filed Chapter 11.
To continue operating during the strike, Eastern hired nonunion replacement workers at greatly reduced wages. For example, replacement pilots were paid $27,500 per year, or 62% less than the $72,000 average wage for union pilots at Eastern. Replacement ramp workers made two-thirds less than the unionized wage, or $5 versus $15 per hour (Salpukas, 1991) . These data provide an indication of the wage premium Eastern paid over market rates. Later, we present more systematic evidence of Eastern's high labor cost structure.
Eastern's management chose to file its Chapter 11 petition with the Federal Court of the Southern District of New York. Because it was a Delaware corporation and Miami was its principal place of business, it could only file in New York by attaching its case to that of its wholly owned New York subsidiary Ionosphere, which ran travel lounges at various airports. Although Ionosphere was an insignificant part of Eastern's operations (its $1.9 million in assets were less than 1% of Eastern's total assets), Eastern was legally entitled to have its case heard in the New York courts. (Several other major bankruptcies were file in the Southern District of New York in a similar fashion. For example, LTV attached itself to Chateaugay Realty, and Johns Manville attached itself to Manville Sales.)
Eastern's decision to file in New York is consistent with the extant evidence that large firms prefer this jurisdiction. Weiss (1990) documents that between 1979 and 1986, 30% of bankrupt New York and American Stock Exchange firms filed in New York, although the U.S. has 93 bankruptcy court districts.
He also shows that violation of the strict priority of claims is the norm for New York bankruptcies. LoPucki and Whitford (1991) report that bankrupt firms strategically select filing districts, presenting evidence that firms seek to "avoid districts that are hostile to extensions of [management's right of] exclusivity, or that aggressively regulate attorney's fees." In fact, the judge assigned to Eastern's case, Burton Lifland, had a reputation as a pro-debtor judge. A Forbes magazine article entitled "A Bankrupt's Best Friend" described Lifland as a judge who "believes that when Congress…reformed Chapter 11, it wanted to give high priority to keeping bankrupt businesses going rather than having them liquidated for the benefit of creditors. Lifland's pro-debtor reputation is so widespread that companies which want to 8 stiff their creditors are known to 'forum shop' to get their cases before him" (Forbes, April 1, 1991, pp.
99-102).
Eastern's choice to file in New York set the stage for the events that unfolded during its courtsupervised Chapter 11 process. The court extended management's exclusive right to file a reorganization plan until February 20, 1990 , almost a year after the Chapter 11 filing. Management proposed three plans during this period. None of the plans came to a vote because severe operating losses quickly made it clear that the plans were not viable. On January 19, 1991, 22 months after filing Chapter 11, Eastern Airlines ceased operations. On December 22, 1994, a plan of reorganization was confirmed by the court. Overall, Eastern's secured creditors received repayment in cash and/or the return of collateral totaling 82% of their claims. Unsecured creditors experienced an average recovery rate of 11.2% of the value of their claims.
Equityholders received nothing. As of this writing the case remains open pending the resolution of several lawsuits.
Eastern's value decline during Chapter 11
To estimate the decline in Eastern's value during bankruptcy, we subtract an estimate of Eastern's value following its Chapter 11 process from an estimate of its value at the time of the Chapter 11 filing. Table 2 presents these estimates. Appendix A provides a detailed analysis of the financial claims against Eastern and the payouts to claimants which provide the foundation for this analysis.
Our estimate of Eastern's value following Chapter 11 is the value received by claimholders over the course of the bankruptcy. A total of $867.7 million in cash was paid out to claimholders. In addition, $1,137.8 million of debt was forgiven by secured creditors in exchange for the return of collateral.
1 The sum of these provides an estimate of $2 billion for Eastern's value post-bankruptcy. We use five different estimates of Eastern's value at the time of its Chapter 11 filing. Each is computed based on alternative data sources or under different assumptions. The value estimates range from $3.5 billion to $4.9 billion.
Based on these estimates, Eastern's decline in value ranges from $1.5 billion to $2.9 billion.
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Although these claims are considered paid in full, it is likely that creditors receiving returned collateral were economically impaired. Because Eastern failed to maintain planes as dictated by the terms of its capital leases, lessors had to make major repairs on many planes to bring them to flying condition. They received a small legal settlement that covered about 20% to 25% of these additional costs. (Gibbs, 1995) . The total dollars are only a small fraction of Eastern's lost value. Fees as a percent of total assets are in the range typical of large U.S. bankruptcies as documented in such studies as Warner (1977) , Weiss (1990) , and Tashjian, Lease, and McConnell (1996) .
Based on the evidence presented above, it is clear that Eastern lost a substantial portion of its value during Chapter 11. What is not clear is why. There are a number of alternative explanations including bad luck, bad management, and poor adjudication of the bankruptcy process. In the sections that follow, we shed light on the plausibility of these alternatives by analyzing critical events over the course of the bankruptcy and the state of the airline industry. billion-went to fund losing operations prior to shutdown and then to cover costs associated with additional asset sales, shutdown, and liquidation. For our purposes in analyzing Eastern's asset sales, the critical issue is not whether management sold assets at fire sale prices, but the use of proceeds from asset sales to fund operating losses. However, it is worth noting that Pulvino (1995) finds that Eastern's post-Chapter 11 aircraft sales average a 12.8% discount from the market price. Of the 73 transactions for which he has reliable data, 64 are for narrow body aircraft. These aircraft are fairly liquid and the discount from market in these sales averaged 7.7%. For the nine wide-body sales, the discounts were substantial, averaging 49.1%. According to Pulvino, these aircraft (Lockheed 1011s) were illiquid aircraft. While an analysis of the pricing of Eastern's planes is beyond the scope of this study, the discount could be due to many factors including Eastern's distressed situation and/or poor maintenance. According to several participants interviewed, both the national unions and Eastern's unionized employees were willing to damage the airline to pressure Lorenzo into selling to employees or another "more suitable" buyer. Lorenzo asserted that the national unions wanted Eastern liquidated to discourage other airlines from taking an aggressive stance toward the unions. In either case, the unions' approach might have been in their interest as representatives of employees at many companies. It was not, however, in the interest of Eastern's unionized employees, at least ex post. For most Eastern employees, dramatic wage concessions at Eastern still would have left them earning more than they could elsewhere.
Because the unions held unsecured claims in the form of payroll, healthcare, and pension benefits, they were represented on the unsecured creditors committee (UCC). (According to several lawyers interviewed, unions are often included as members of the UCC when they are also large creditors.) Their interests, however, were often quite different from those of other unsecured creditors. The following quotations, excerpted from comments made by a number of UCC members, reflect views on the unions' effect on UCC dynamics:
-The thrust of the labor approach was to eliminate Lorenzo, and they were willing to do a Samson and pull the temple down on the employees to achieve their goal.
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-You have to wonder whether the union representatives were defending their members or looking after the union hierarchy.
-The unions were always against management, but they were willing to give wage concessions [to a new owner] to help the airline survive.
-The problem with the unions was that even when they were right, they could never sway the committee. There were leaks to the press and the [aircraft and parts] manufacturers [on the UCC] did not want to align themselves with the unions. Also, most of the committee members could not stand the union representatives' lengthy, condescending oral viewpoints.
Union leaders were apparently willing to risk everything to get rid of Lorenzo. They worked to make him the primary issue, rather than the airline's economic status. Employees were willing to publicly declare Eastern an unsafe airline, which probably contributed to the firm's decline in value. A former nonunion employee of Eastern Airlines noted the bitterness of the unions towards Lorenzo:
The unions waged an all-out campaign against Lorenzo. No other labor conflict has ever had employees going out and asking the public to stop supporting the business which provided their paychecks. Pilots would testify to Congress about how unsafe the airline was, scaring the public, and then fly home on Eastern. The press is accountable for not accurately disclosing the events. Congress is accountable for supporting the unions to get their political action committee money. And the union leadership is accountable for playing a cruel hoax on the employees by telling them that Frank Lorenzo was the issue and his disappearance was worth risking their jobs.
From the beginning, the unions pushed to have Lorenzo replaced with a trustee. They were pleased when Martin R. Shugrue was appointed. At that time, Charles Bryan, leader of the International Association of Machinists, believed the company could survive. He commented that there would be tremendous "sacrifices over the next year, maybe two years or more, to bring us back to normalcy" (Salpukas, 1990) . Unfortunately, normalcy never returned to Eastern. In fact, the machinists did not end their strike until January 28, 1991, a week after Eastern shut down. Even at that point, hostility toward Eastern persisted. A newspaper account reported that "as word filtered out Friday night that Eastern
Airlines would shut down, some members of the machinists union, which has been striking the company since March 1989 , rejoiced" (Salpukas, 1990 . It is hard to believe that such a celebration was justified in terms of the individual machinists' pecuniary self-interest. 14
Conflict between unsecured creditors and management
The members of Eastern's UCC represented all unsecured creditor groups (two suppliers, five manufacturers, five unsecured bondholders, and four employee groups). In documenting the conflict between the UCC and management, we present data on returns to Eastern's convertible subordinated debentures in response to various events in the bankruptcy. These securities are publicly traded and have a price series that is more complete than Eastern's other publicly traded securities. They rank just above equity in terms of priority and were considered junk bonds several years prior to Eastern's Chapter 11 (in 1987, Moody's rated them Caa; the agency lowered the rating to Ca in 1988). Ultimately, they recovered only 6% of their face value (see Appendix A). Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from conducting a conventional daily event study. Thin, and sometimes infrequent, trading in Eastern's convertible subordinated debentures results in an incomplete daily return series. The almost continual release of new information about the case makes it impossible to isolate the effect of specific events. Instead, we present returns for discrete periods during the bankruptcy process. The periods are constructed based on major shifts in the direction of the proceedings. In addition to cumulative bond returns, we report operating profitability data for each period. Table 4 Ueberroth's offer was contingent on the unions ending the strike and agreeing to wage and benefit concessions by April 12, 1989 . On April 11, 1989 , the unions agreed to a five-year contract that included $210 million in concessions. They refused, however, to return to work as long as Lorenzo ran the company. Lorenzo refused to cede control of the company until the deal was finalized. Ueberroth required two weeks to undertake his due diligence process, including an assessment of whether customers would return to Eastern after employees returned to work. Union resistance persisted despite Lorenzo's immediate offer to run the company jointly with Ueberroth. Reports indicated that the machinists' union worried that if they went back to work and the deal fell through, the pilots' union would not support a second strike. The standoff over the two-week interim period broke the deal.
Management's first reorganization plan. Shortly after the failure of the Ueberroth deal, Texas
Air announced it was not interested in selling Eastern. It planned to restructure the company, sell assets, and operate a smaller airline. On April 24, 1989, Eastern presented its first plan of reorganization to the unsecured creditors' committee. The plan promised $1.8 billion in asset sales, including 40% of the company's aircraft, and full repayment of secured and unsecured creditors. Bond prices rose to $65.5 during this period, a 21.3% return from Ueberroth's withdrawal and a 56.0% return over the course of the case.
According to Lorenzo, managers realized they had been overly optimistic after a few months in bankruptcy. Eastern's operating performance continued to deteriorate. As a result, tension on the unsecured creditors' committee escalated as claimants' interests diverged. On August 30, 1989, Eastern publicly announced that its first plan was not viable. During the remainder of 1989, the judge allowed the firm to withdraw $210 million from escrow and granted management several extensions of its exclusive right to file a reorganization plan. By late December 1989, bond prices had dropped 10.7% to $58.5.
Cumulative bond returns, however, continued to be positive at 39.9%. Extending the exclusive period makes it almost impossible to negotiate with a debtor. The debtor's strongest weapon is to delay. The time value of money will bring creditors to their knees, forcing them to capitulate.
Management
In contrast, Harvey Miller, Eastern's lawyer and one of the country's preeminent bankruptcy attorneys, argued that judges extend the exclusive period because companies legitimately require more time to come up with a business plan:
All of these Chapter 11 cases are fact driven, and all these businesses are different. What seems to develop in these cases is that the bankruptcy judge is probably the single most important person. Because the judge is going to evaluate the parochial decisions that are taken by various constituencies, the concept of delay really depends on him. There are cases which move very quickly in the appropriate circumstances depending on the business. I think there is no place for the statute to say what the exclusive period is. That should be left to the court.
Not surprisingly, the lawyers' views reflect their clients' interests.
Requesting a trustee. Finally, creditors gave up on management and formally requested the appointment of a trustee. The following comments summarize UCC members' views on this period of the bankruptcy. They are consistent with an initial optimism concerning management's ability to revitalize
Eastern and a subsequent deterioration of this optimism. Unsecured creditors cited conflicts among themselves, loss of trust in Lorenzo's reliability, and industry conditions as factors leading to their request for a trustee. Some representative comments follow:
-All the creditors were aligned at the start of the case when we were promised 100%. The committee stopped working together after four months when it became clear we would not be fully paid. People started looking at their vested interests. Separate cohesive subgroups formed and there was inner turmoil. There were subplots like a mystery novel.
It was extremely stressful. People got personally involved and forgot about their duties. We asked for a trustee in part to try and get our interests together.
-We initially viewed Frank Lorenzo as a savvy and knowledgeable airline executive who would be hard to replace, and no replacements were evident. Eastern's problems went back a decade and Lorenzo had success with Continental. But after being hit with a series of missed projections, we lost confidence in Lorenzo. He had reneged too many times.
-The reorganization process was going well and Eastern was ahead of its targets. Then Lorenzo started to believe his own press. He decided he didn't have to downsize the company, but could expand the Miami hub and hold onto the Latin American routes. The company bled huge amounts of cash before Lorenzo agreed to return to the initial plan. Then the market softened.
-Lorenzo did not act in bad faith with the various offers he made. He believed he could do it. It is a really tough industry, and Eastern was the first of a rash of airline bankruptcies. No one could have known it would get so bad.
In his ruling to appoint a trustee, Judge Lifland stated:
Throughout this case, Eastern has continually made operating projections which it has failed to achieve with the resultant losses being borne by unsecured creditors. …By admission of the Chairman of the Board, Frank Lorenzo, these losses have wiped out the parent Texas Air's equity. The Debtor's inability to formulate a business plan and make operating projections which have a longevity of more than several months, along with continuing enormous operating losses being sustained by the estate, mandate that this Court order the appointment of a trustee for "cause,…including incompetence" (Bankruptcy document docket #2670, April 19, 1990).
Agency problems and asset stripping
The appointment of a trustee through shutdown. Even prior to a trustee's appointment, the judge and the UCC disagreed about the trustee's role. Early in the case, Lifland vowed "to keep Eastern in the air and thus serve the flying public's interest. He suggested creditors needn't ask for liquidation. Hell or high water, he wanted those planes up" (Business Week, Dec. 17, 1990, p. 29) . Aware of Lifland's opposition to liquidating Eastern, the UCC requested a trustee who would continue to run the airline while trying to find a buyer. During discussions concerning a trustee's appointment, Judge Lifland was adamant that "any trustee would be charged with continuing to operate the airline, rather than slowly liquidating it" (Business Week, Dec. 17, 1990, p. 29 The committee wanted someone who would conduct a sale or other disposition of the airline. Shugrue asked the committee for a couple of months to try and save the airline. The committee agreed because they believed Judge Lifland would give it to him anyway.
Alan S. Boyd, Chairman of Airbus Industrie of North America, Inc., which was both a secured and unsecured creditor and a member of the UCC, described the initial meeting between the UCC and the trustee:
The committee met with Shugrue before his approval. We asked him for an assessment of Eastern Airlines. He said he did not believe it had a future as an independent entity. He said he would try to improve morale, stabilize operations, and then sell the company in whole or in part. We agreed to put on a brave face to improve morale.
Unfortunately for the UCC, both Shugrue and Lifland focused on resurrecting the ailing airline (Lawrence, 1993 ; court documents). When Shugrue was appointed, the judge allowed him to withdraw $80 million from the escrow account to fund operations. In response, the bond price dropped by 23.1% in just under one week to $20.
As the trustee continued to operate the airline, and the judge continued to release funds from escrow, their relationships with the UCC deteriorated further. UCC members commented:
-After two months it became apparent that the committee had made a mistake about Shugrue. Shugrue had given his word that if he couldn't turn the airline around in two months he would shut it down. [Shugrue denies he made such a statement.] It was six weeks before Shugrue met with creditors. He said he was too busy. He seemed to forget it was the creditors' money. He has an incredible ego, he believed he could turn Eastern around and be another Lee Iaccoca. [Iaccoca, former chairman and chief executive officer of Chrysler Corporation, managed that company from the brink of bankruptcy to financial health.] -Unfortunately, both the judge and the trustee fought the creditors' committee on every issue. We would do our due diligence and the trustee would tell us we did not understand the business.
By this time, the UCC was adamant about shutting down Eastern. Its members, however, felt that they could not act openly because they were trapped in a catch-22 situation. Creditors wanted to buy time 19 to preserve the ability to sell the airline and its assets, but they knew the trustee was not co-operating and that the judge would support his position. If they publicly expressed their views, people might stop flying Eastern and the losses (funded with creditor money) would increase. Also, UCC members had signed confidentiality agreements and risked being sued for going public. Members of the committee explained:
-The trustee and the judge were clearly out of line. The pure math showed the company could not survive, and the judge's and trustee's responsibilities were to the creditors. The trustee was working for his own agenda. He enjoyed the visibility and the money. 3 We went on record complaining to the judge that the trustee was spending funds on items without getting the committee's approval, but the judge allowed it. The judge believed he was protecting the public by keeping the airline flying. We told the judge he was deceiving the public by implying the airline would exist for another year when we all knew it wouldn't.
-We told the judge that we were convinced that the estate was in jeopardy of being administratively insolvent. The judge castigated us for having the audacity to complain and threaten Eastern's survival.
-In the beginning of October 1990, the creditorsí committee finally told Shugrue that we would go public if he did not agree to sell the airline. We set up rules for how to proceed, and Shugrue agreed-providing there were no miracles to save the airline like Delta's pilots going on strike. At the end of the month the committee asked Shugrue for a shutdown plan, which had already been prepared under Lorenzo. Shut down plans are very sophisticated and need careful implementation to work. You can lose phenomenal amounts of money if it's not done right. Well, Shugrue told us lightning had struck and the company was turning around and had found a so-called expert to support his view. We did not accept his plan and asked him to shut the airline down, or we would go public with our views.
On November 9, 1990, Shugrue announced that Eastern's operations could generate positive cash flow by the first quarter of 1991, but it would require additional escrow funds. On November 14, 1990, the UCC responded by publicly announcing that it wanted Eastern liquidated. Shugrue objected and the judge ruled in his favor, allowing Eastern to continue operations.
To fund a "do-or-die" effort to revive Eastern, the judge released an additional $150 million from escrow. The UCC openly opposed the release of the $150 million. A creditor commented: 3 Shugrue's compensation for serving as Eastern's trustee was initially $35,000 a month and was retroactively increased by the judge to $50,000 per month. The implied annual salaries of $420,000 and $600,000 are similar to the $531,000 salary of Delta's CEO. It would not be surprising if Shugrue made more than the CEO of a healthy airline. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) document that distressed firms often pay compensation premiums to attract talented managers.
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When we lost the hearings there was extreme disappointment and dismay. There was also a strong inclination for mass resignations. Our lawyers advised us against it to prevent any further deterioration in the public perception. We did not want the judge to have a basis to come back at us for going public. So we were now worried about being suedhow ironic-so we shut up and tried to do what we could.
Shugrue implemented a new marketing program to attract business fliers by offering first class seating for the price of a full coach fare. To accommodate the expected increase in first class traffic, Eastern Airlines doubled the size of the first class cabin on all its planes, losing almost two coach class seats for each new first class seat. At the same time, Eastern lowered its coach fares at least 15% below its competitors' prevailing rates.
The UCC had little hope that Shugrue's new strategy for Eastern would be successful. To turn Eastern around, the trustee's strategy required revenue increases that the UCC thought were too high, and projected fuel prices they thought were too low. By this time, even Lorenzo did not believe Eastern could operate as an independent firm. He stated:
The problem with Eastern was the more it flew the more it lost. There were no business travelers, only low fare passengers. Eastern had no balance in its route structure. We were trying to scale back to 75 North-South flights and then blend it into Continental. The Atlanta hub would have worked very well in Continental. Fuel run-up was not the issue. Without some sort of a merger with an airline with a better route system, Eastern could not have survived.
To make matters worse, Shugrue's change in strategy coincided with the increase in oil prices that accompanied the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
4 Shugrue dismissed criticisms of his operating strategy as "Monday morning quarterbacking," and said that "the creditors were already getting so little that the attempt to keep Eastern aloft was worth the risk if it could save jobs" (Business Week, November 11, 1991).
Shugrue's strategy generated operating losses totaling $442 million in less than eight months. expected recovery of less than 2%, which is close to the discounted value of the 6% these security holders received four years later. The total return during the trustee's management was a negative 92.8%.
After Eastern ceased operations, the UCC was able to affect the final outcome. Following the shutdown, Shugrue proposed selling Eastern's major assets at bid prices he received from other airlines totaling $155 million. The UCC requested a public auction. After a hearing on the matter, the judge decided to hold an auction on February 4 and 5, 1991. The auction generated $259 million, $104 million more than the trustee's offers (New York Times, February 6, 1991; court records). A UCC member commented:
We had to scramble to sell the perishable assets. The FAA has a rule that if airline slots are not used two-thirds of the time over a 60-day period, the airline loses them. Once you shut down you have 20 days to sell them. Fortunately, we had prepared all the legal work in advance. We had also negotiated with other airlines, so we knew who wanted which slots and how much they would pay. The trustee came in with an offer for the slots. The committee told the judge it was tens of millions of dollars too low. Imagine, we were still banging heads with the trustee and the judge. Shugrue finally saw the writing on the wall and relented. We had an auction and saw a big time increase in the proceeds received for the slots.
As late as 1994, Shugrue came forward with a plan to keep what remained of Eastern flying. He
proposed raising $100 million in equity and providing service to eight cities with Atlanta serving as the primary base of operations. His "Fly Plan 1994" never got off the ground (Blake, 1994) .
Looking back, Shugrue praised the outcome of Eastern's bankruptcy (Appleson, 1994) . He commented, "In working to meet our obligations to Eastern's creditors, we are pleased that the cash recovery we have been able to realize represents a high water mark in this industry." Dallas attorney Robin
Phelan, an observer from the American Bankruptcy Research Institute, disagreed. Eastern's bankruptcy, he said, was a "complete and total screw-up. It's the classic example of the big-case mentality that the debtor is to be preserved at all costs. Instead of reorganizing, some businesses don't need to exist" ("A Billion Later, Eastern's Finally Gone," American Lawyer Newspaper Group., Inc., February 6, 1995).
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Industry conditions and Eastern's performance
Managers of competitor airlines argued that their firms incurred losses because of the court's protection of Eastern. This is consistent with Borenstein and Rose (1995) who find that Eastern was the only U.S. airline to lower prices after filing Chapter 11. A member of the UCC explained:
The judge would not listen to the creditors. He cost Delta, USAir, and other airlines hundreds of millions of dollars because they had to compete with Eastern. This is not capitalism. Lifland did whatever he felt like. He was a result-oriented judge, a dictator who rationalized whatever he did. It made me lose faith in the system. There were many times I asked myself whether I was in a court in Paraguay.
In remarks before the Rockdale County Kiwanis Club on June 27, 1991, James Callison, Senior Vice President of Delta Airlines, made the following statement:
The fares that Eastern employed as it attempted to reorganize in bankruptcy were below Delta's cost of doing business. Eastern was able to sustain such low pricing only because it was-improperly in my opinion-subsidized by the bankruptcy court. The court attempted to act as an arbiter of the "public interest" even though that was not its duty or right. This let Eastern use creditors' money to price below cost, which in turn, inflicted heavy losses on competing airlines, and in the end did Eastern no good. A weak carrier cannot provide healthy competition. It has to resort to below-cost pricing to keep cash coming in, and will always be looking for a handout. It is a wounded animal, and in that condition weakens all airlines operating around it, and, in the long term, hurts rather than helps competition.
In a letter written to us, Shugrue responded:
With respect to comments made by Delta and other carriers, those comments by definition are biased and should be noted as such. For purposes of Eastern's Chapter 11 case, it is irrelevant what impact Eastern's discounting had on Delta. The funds utilized to continue Eastern's operations were calculated to obtain a ridership sufficient to support a standalone operation.
We investigate the impact of events in Eastern Airlines' bankruptcy on the stock prices of Delta, American, United and USAir over three-day windows. With the exception of the day of the Eastern shutdown, when all four carriers experienced a sharp stock price increase, we find no significant movements. However, a substantial drop in oil prices, which would also result in increased stock prices, occurred during the same period. (Oil prices dropped from $32.50 per barrel on January 16, 1991 to $20.05 on January 18, 1991.)
Although many airlines struggled during the period Eastern was in Chapter 11, Eastern underperformed all but Braniff (see Table 1 ). Thus, it seems unlikely that Eastern's losses are attributable solely 23 to a weak industry. We now analyze in more detail how industry conditions affected Eastern's performance and find that the time period was a difficult one for U.S. airlines. Industry conditions, however, do not explain a large portion of Eastern's decline in value.
Industry-adjusted operating performance
To determine the extent to which Eastern's poor operating performance was due to industry conditions, we collect operating performance data for thirteen large, publicly traded U.S. airlines from The Aviation and Aerospace Almanac. This source provides detailed data on three major categories of operating costs: labor, fuel, and other operating costs. Other operating costs include passenger food, advertising and promotional expenses, landing fees, rental payments, maintenance expenses, and interest expense. For each year 1987-1990, we estimate the average industry cost structure by computing the mean of each operating cost category as a percentage of operating revenue.
As an estimate of the effect of industry conditions on Eastern's operating performance, we compute Eastern's profitability "as if" it had the average industry cost structure. In other words, we compute what Eastern's performance would have been if the firm had generated the same operating revenues but had a cost structure equal to the industry average in terms of percent of operating revenues. Table 5 Table 5 compares Eastern's cost structure to the industry average. The data support the claim by Lorenzo and others that Eastern's labor costs were out of line with the industry. This is particularly true of maintenance labor. Operating with average industry labor costs would have increased Eastern's operating profit by $554.4, enough to cover its operating loss almost three times. Although
Eastern's maintenance labor was less than 4% of total costs, and less than 10% of labor costs, it was 24 $179.5 million greater than the industry average, enough to cover the company's $150.6 million operating losses in 1987-1988. In both the fuel and other cost categories, Eastern's costs as a percent of operating revenues were less than the industry average.
During the two years following the Chapter 11 filing, Eastern's performance deteriorated relative to the industry. The fact that the industry was not doing well is reflected in the "as if" estimate of Eastern's operating profit. Operating at the average cost structure, Eastern would have experienced an operating loss of $13.8 million for the period 1989-1990. However, the estimated loss pales in comparison to Eastern's actual $1.4 billion operating loss. Holding its 1989-1990 operating costs constant, Eastern would have required 37% more in operating revenues to achieve average profitability.
While labor costs continued to contribute to Eastern's difficulties, post-Chapter 11 maintenance labor was much closer to the industry average. Total labor costs exceeded the "as if" industry average by $355.2 million, of which only $7.7 million represented excess maintenance labor costs. Post-Chapter 11, the bulk of Eastern's troubles appear to reside in the "other operating costs" category. Relative to the industry average, Eastern spent an excess of $879.0 million in this area. Examining the details of costs in the "other operating costs" category reveals that the dollar amount of Eastern's spending declined dramatically. Unfortunately, the decline in operating costs was not sufficient to offset Eastern's precipitous drop in operating revenues.
The evidence is consistent with massive value destruction and the transfer of wealth from financial claimholders to other "stakeholders." The excess in "other operating costs" is evidence either of an inability to cut operating costs quickly enough or of spending to support revenues that never materialized.
In fact, between 1988 and 1989, Eastern's operating revenues dropped 60%, while operating costs dropped only 41%. "Other operating costs" dropped only 31%. Between 1989 and 1990, Eastern's revenues increased almost 41%, but the revenue increase was not sufficient to compensate for Eastern's bloated cost structure.
Security returns for Eastern and the industry
To further examine the effect of industry factors on Eastern's performance, Fig. 1 presents an index of returns to Eastern's convertible subordinated debt. Recall that these debt securities are publicly 25 traded and can be considered Eastern's residual claims. We also present an industry index of bond prices, an industry index of stock prices, and an index of market prices for narrow body aircraft; the price index for wide body aircraft follows a similar pattern (Pulvino, 1995) . Each index is computed weekly and is the value of $1.00 invested on March 6, 1989 (three days prior to the Eastern strike) through Eastern's shutdown on January 19, 1991. The index for aircraft prices is computed similarly, but only quarterly data are available.
As Fig. 1 illustrates, Eastern's bonds outperformed industry bonds and stocks from the Chapter 11 filing date through late 1989. These returns reflect initial optimism about the possibility of a reorganization or restructuring plan that preserved value. In January 1990, the company's bonds began to lose value. The drop in aircraft prices probably explains at least part of this value decline since Eastern engaged in major asset sales during this period. Between the last quarter of 1989 and the first quarter of 1990, the aircraft price index dropped 24% (from 1.10 to 0.83) and Eastern's bond price index fell 44%
(from 1.48 to 0.82).
But while aircraft prices subsequently rebounded, Eastern's bonds did not. With the exception of a brief period in March 1990, Eastern's bond value fell steadily from early 1990 until the firm ceased operations. By that time, the bonds had lost 96% of their value. Industry bond and stock indexes declined relatively slightly.
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During this period, both Eastern's bond price and other airlines' stock price performance were potentially confounded by the effects of pre-Gulf War activity. Eastern did not experience the Gulf War's full effect on the airline industry as it ceased operations two days after the air war began. In fact, prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Eastern's cumulative bond return was almost -68%. From the week prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 to the week of Eastern's shutdown, the airline stock index dropped 17% from 0.69 to 0.58. During the same period, Eastern's bonds dropped by 87% (the index dropped from 0.33 to 0.04).
Because the stocks of firms in distress are often delisted, a potential concern is an upward bias in the industry stock index. In fact, the only equity to cease trading during this period was Braniff, which filed Chapter 11 in September 1989. The returns to other major carriers who filed Chapter 11 after Eastern (Pan Am, American West, and TWA) are included in the index.
Industry conditions clearly diminished Eastern's performance. Our analysis, however, indicates that the majority of Eastern's value decline cannot be attributed to a weak industry.
Conclusions
Eastern Airlines' bankruptcy illustrates how court-sponsored asset stripping can destroy value.
The case demonstrates how important it is for the bankruptcy process to protect distressed firms' assets, not only from a run by creditors but from overly optimistic managers and misguided judges. Ideally, a judge would be skilled enough to provide protection from value-destroying actions and the discipline to motivate productive restructuring or exit. In reality, this seems a lot to ask, especially when valuemaximization requires that painful decisions be made. In Eastern's case, Judge Lifland's support of attempts to revive Eastern resulted in massive value destruction, and failed to preserve the company or jobs.
In identifying problems with Chapter 11, many authors, such as Meckling (1977) , have focused on the importance of upholding the priority of claims in bankruptcy. They warn that systematic violation of priority will result in increased contracting and financing costs. This study identifies asset stripping as a more basic, and potentially more damaging, problem. In order to have anything to distribute to claimholders, whether or not strict priority is upheld, the court must protect the value of a firm's assets.
For distressed firms with liquid or potentially liquid assets, such as cash or planes, this is a serious problem. The temptation to use liquid assets to prolong the firm's survival, even if doing so destroys value, can prove irresistible. In addition, such actions are easily rationalized; because they postpone the fallout of painful outcomes, they appear to be the socially responsible thing to do. The avoidance of painful decisions is more likely to arise when massive downsizing or shutdown is required. This implies that
Chapter 11 is likely to result in a poor allocation of resources when a large or highly visible nonviable firm is distressed.
Some might argue that evidence of asset stripping in Eastern's bankruptcy is not evidence of a problem with Chapter 11 itself. We disagree. While Eastern's Chapter 11 experience is probably extreme, it provides a powerful illustration of how value destruction through asset stripping can occur. While asset stripping at Eastern was fairly blatant, the potential for more subtle asset stripping in other transactions 27 clearly exists. Judge Lifland was able to administer Eastern's bankruptcy as he did because Chapter 11 not only allows, but arguably invites, such administration. A better-formulated bankruptcy system would prevent such outcomes. The threat of asset stripping, combined with the well documented routine violations of absolute priority, enables junior claimants to extract resources from more senior claimants.
As Jensen (1991) argues, this would not occur if the law forced an immediate sale of control rights (or liquidation if no bidders appeared) and forced the distribution of the proceeds according to strict priority.
The potential for asset stripping is a largely unexamined problem that has important implications for optimal debt capacity. Its effect runs counter to analysis presented in Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
They argue that distressed firms selling assets are likely to face an illiquid market because their industry peers are also distressed. Thus, assets can only be sold at "fire sale" prices. They conclude that this illiquidity reduces a firm's debt capacity. In contrast, as Eastern's case illustrates, asset liquidity is what allows value-destroying asset stripping to occur. Illiquid assets would provide creditors with protection from such actions. Unless a credible promise can be made not to engage in asset stripping, including the court's willingness to protect assets in Chapter 11, asset liquidity will reduce, not increase, a firm's ability to issue debt securities. We predict that as capital markets continue to develop and provide increased liquidity in a variety of asset markets, the problem of asset stripping will increase in importance. possible to obtain precise information on all claims and their payouts and recovery rates. To our knowledge, there is no source that consistently reports payouts throughout the course of the bankruptcy.
Reports filed with the court provide interim information, but are not always consistent with one another.
Major participants in the bankruptcy provided us with additional information and reviewed our table for overall accuracy, but their information is also incomplete. The inability to obtain complete information on these facts is itself evidence of the information problems in bankruptcy proceedings. Also, many claims subject to litigation were settled out of court and some lawsuits remain unsettled. When possible, we include legal settlements in payouts and recovery rate computations. When information is sketchy or estimates are made, table footnotes explain the details.
Because we cannot determine the precise timing of payouts, we do not adjust for the time value of money. Also, when a claimant is classified as legally unimpaired, we report a 100% recovery rate.
Therefore, when a claimant is economically damaged (as many were) by delay in payment or deterioration in value of returned collateral it does not show up in our data. Both these factors serve to overstate the value of payouts relative to claims, and thus bias our estimates of the value recovered by Eastern's claimants upward. For example, unsecured creditors did not receive their first distribution until early 1995, six years after the filing, so the net present value of their payout was substantially less than the dollar amount they received. In addition, many secured creditors reported that equipment was returned to them in poor or damaged condition.
A.1. Claims against Eastern
At the time of its Chapter 11 filing, Eastern faced over $3.7 billion in claims from secured and unsecured claimants. 6 Table A1 summarizes claims against Eastern and the payouts and recovery rates to 6 Reported claims against Eastern sometimes run as high as $13 billion. These include redundant claims that were later eliminated or reduced via negotiation, and the maximum dollar claims against Eastern in various lawsuits. Our analysis excludes redundant claims and other claims disallowed by the court.
2 date. The sum of fixed claims against Eastern and our estimate of the market value of its equity is almost $5 billion. About 32% of Eastern's claims were secured. If accrued interest is included, secured claims totaled $1.5 billion. Eastern's capital lease obligations were also secured and totaled $674 million. The remaining $1.6 billion represents fixed claims made by unsecured claimants, including trade creditors, subordinated noteholders and debentureholders, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, and retirees entitled to healthcare coverage.
In addition to fixed claims, Eastern had common and preferred stock outstanding. The preferred stock had four series with a book value totaling $613 million. Only one preferred series had regularly available market prices, so to estimate the market value we multiplied the market-to-book ratio of this issue
to the book value of the remaining issues. The resulting estimate of the market value of Eastern's preferred stock at the time of its Chapter 11 filing is $351 million.
Because Eastern's common stock was not publicly traded, we estimate its value using post-Chapter 11 acquisition offer prices. Clearly, acquisition offer prices are not the same as market trading prices.
They will include a control premium (or discount in fire sale situations) and, like market prices, an estimate of anticipated value change in Chapter 11. Nonetheless, they are objective third-party valuations and so provide useful information for our purposes. Adding the $464 million offered by Peter Ueberroth in his failed post-filing attempt to purchase Eastern's common stock (excluding the East Coast Shuttle) to the $356 million Donald Trump paid for the Shuttle, we arrive at an estimate of $820 million for the value of Eastern's common stock. To the extent our estimate includes an anticipated value decline or a fire sale discount, our calculations will understate Eastern's decline in value due to financial distress and the court process.
A.2. Payouts and recovery rates
Cash payouts to Eastern's claimholders and debt forgiveness due to the return of collateral totaled $2 billion. Overall, Eastern's secured creditors received repayment in cash and/or the return of collateral totaling 82% of their claims. This is larger than average Chapter 11 recoveries by secured creditors of 60% to 80% documented by Franks and Torous (1989) , Lopucki and Woodford (1991), and Weiss (1990) .
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Only two classes of secured creditors, Eastern's second and third equipment certificateholders, received less than full recovery. For reasons explained later, they recovered 60% and 6%, respectively.
Unsecured creditors experienced an overall recovery rate of 11.2% of the value of their claims.
The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation experienced the largest recovery because it received a cash settlement of $30 million in addition to a $565 million general unsecured claim that, along with other general unsecured claims, ultimately received an 11% payout. Most of Eastern's remaining unsecured creditors received an 11% payout. Convertible subordinated debtholders received a 6% recovery because early in the process they agreed to exchange their securities for a $139 million unsecured claim (which received an 11% payout) and some preferred stock (which received a 0% payout). Healthcare claimants received an 8% payout, and government imposed fines and penalties totaling $50.5 million remained unpaid. Eastern's equityholders received nothing. This stands in sharp contrast to the typical outcome of a large Chapter 11 case, in which stockholders retain some stake in the reorganized firm.
The distribution of payments across claimholders reflects a violation of absolute priority between secured and unsecured creditors. Specifically, distributions were made to Eastern's unsecured creditors even though second and third equipment certificate holders were impaired. This is consistent with evidence from large sample studies of U.S. bankruptcies, which document violations of absolute priority in most reorganization plans.
An examination of the details of the case indicates that the second and third certificate holders had insufficient collateral to ensure repayment. In addition, their lawyers failed to file a request for priority over unsecured creditors to cover collateral deficiencies. (Other secured creditors did this successfully, and second and third certificate holders sued their lawyers over this issue.) As a result, these certificate holders received unsecured claims to cover their collateral shortfall. The payout on these unsecured claims went largely to second certificate holders. This occurred for two reasons: i) the second certificate holders' claims were superior, and ii) the third certificate holders' indenture included a provision requiring them to turn over funds recovered from unsecured claims until second certificate holders were paid in full. As there was substantial overlap in the identity of second and third certificate holders, this arrangement was agreeable to many parties, and explains the 6% recovery rate for third certificate holders. (b) The industry group is comprised of all COMPUSTAT listed U.S. Airlines with assets in excess of $500 million. Each fiscal year has data on a minimum of ten and a maximum of 13 industry competitors. Although separate data are available for some years, Continental is excluded because Eastern and Continental are owned by the same holding company and this might confound the findings. Of the industry competitors, only Braniff filed Chapter 11 during this period (9/89). Other major carriers to file over the next several years were Pan Am (1/91), American West (6/91), and TWA (1/92). (a) Deposits to escrow accounts were less than asset sale proceeds because some funds went directly to fund costs associated with asset sales and operations. To assess how bond prices move as events unfold, we take the next price reported after an event. If that price is more than three trading days following the event, it is denoted with an "*" in Appendix A.
(b) Monthly operating profit is taken from the bankruptcy trustee's interim reports and financial statements filed with the court. Eastern's actual operating performance in millions of dollars is presented in the first line of the table. As a benchmark for comparison, an estimate is made of Eastern's performance "as if" it had the average industry cost structure. For each year, the average industry cost structure is estimated using data on 13 publicly traded U.S. airlines with data available on COMPUSTAT and in The Aviation and Aerospace Almanac. For each of three cost categories (fuel, labor, and other costs) the industry average as a percentage of operating revenue is taken. Based on these average percentages and Eastern's actual operating revenue, an "as if" estimate of Eastern's costs is calculated. The difference between Eastern's actual and "as if" operating profit can be viewed as either the excess of Eastern's cost over those common in the industry, or the amount by which operating revenues would have had to increase for Eastern to have average profits given its cost structure. Details of the differences between Eastern's cost structure and the average industry cost structure are presented in Appendix A.
Two Years Before Eastern's Chapter 11 (1987 and 1988) Two Years After Eastern's Chapter 11 (1989 and 1990) Data Source: The Aviation and Aerospace Almanac. Eastern's actual operating performance as a percent of operating revenues and in millions of dollars is presented. As a benchmark for comparison, an estimate is made of Eastern's performance "as if" it had the average industry cost structure. The average industry cost structure is estimated using data on 13 publicly traded U.S. airlines with data available on COMPUSTAT and in The Aviation and Aerospace Almanac. For each of three cost categories (fuel, labor, and other costs) the average as a percentage of operating revenue is taken. Based on these average percentages and Eastern's actual operating revenue, an "as if" estimate of Eastern's costs is calculated. The difference between Eastern's actual and "as if" operating profit can be viewed as either the excess of Eastern's cost over those common in the industry, or the amount by which operating revenues would have had to increase for Eastern to have average profits given its cost structure. Details of the differences between Eastern's cost structure and the average industry cost structure are presented in Panels B and C. Airplane Price Index (a) The Bond Index consists of data from publicly traded bonds of American, USAir, and Delta Airlines. The Stock Index includes data from eight publicly traded major U.S. carriers. Aircraft price index data are from
